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ARTICLES
THE  COMMON  LAW  AS  AN  ITERATIVE  PROCESS:
A  PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
INTRODUCTION
This Article considers how the common law is a remarkably stable
system that constrains judicial discretion through a complement of
initial conditions linking cases over time with the possibility of bifurca-
tions that enable it to chart significant changes in course.  This Article
draws upon but recasts legal theories of path dependence to reveal
the common law as an iterative process—a system of endless repeti-
tion that is simultaneously stable and dynamic, self-similar but evolv-
ing, complex but simple.
The first two Parts give an account of the common law as an itera-
tive process, a modern perspective on an ancient problem of under-
standing the evolutionary nature of the common law.1  The common
 2006 Lawrence A. Cunningham.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Business, Libby Scholar and Academic Dean, Boston
College Law School.  Thanks to the participants in faculty workshops at the University
of Iowa College of Law and George Washington University Law School and to Tony
D’Amato, Jan Deutsch, Mel Eisenberg, Dorsey (Dan) Ellis, Adam Hirsch, Arthur
Jacobson, Ken Kress, Larry Mitchell, and Alan Wolf.
1 The evolutionary tradition in common law jurisprudence dates to Savigny and
Maine, who claimed that law evolved out of the common spirit of a people, but never
said precisely how.  Holmes and Corbin sought to explain how by showing that some
legal rules are stronger and others weaker and that the strong ones survive.  But this
explanation did not uncover the mechanisms by which strong legal rules survive or
how to distinguish between strong and weak rules, other than by survival.  Following a
fifty-year hiatus in evolutionary theories of the common law, Robert Clark revived the
subject in the 1970s and was quickly joined by George Priest and other law and eco-
nomics scholars.  These scholars tried to answer the question Holmes and Corbin left
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law’s iterative process consists of continuously repeated dispute resolu-
tion in discrete cases.  Each case creates a legal result available for use
in succeeding cases, where it can be used to reach a new legal result,
available for use in reaching yet new legal results in later cases, and so
on without end.  By this endless iteration, all cases are systemically
linked to all prior cases, by the conditions—the facts and circum-
stances—present in the first case and all intervening ones.  Hence the
common law exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions.  This
is a principle developed in the past twenty years by physicists studying
iterative systems and illustrated at work in the common law in Part I.
These initial conditions thus generate a path dependency in the
common law from which it may sometimes be hard to escape.  Yet the
paths are escaped, and Part II pursues the question of how by present-
ing a second principle of iterative processes, called self-similarity.  Self-
similarity in an iterative process exists to the extent that the output of
one operation bears a close resemblance to the output in the next
operation.  Applications of an existing legal rule to new legal disputes
bear that quality when legal disputes generated by the rule’s initial
conditions continue to be resolved in the same way.  Non-self-similar
applications of a legal rule involve material departures from the way
the rule is first formulated and applied.
When self-similarity dominates the way a legal rule is applied dur-
ing a phase of the common law process, the population of legal dis-
putes cognizable under that rule is relatively stable.  The evolution
and articulation of social norms promote the growth of non-self-simi-
larity and that growth threatens the stability in the population of legal
disputes.  The threat to stability and the path dependency created by
initial conditions is overcome by judicial bifurcation of the input rule
in a later dispute so that the population of legal disputes attracted by
the population of legal rules regains stability.
The next two Parts draw normative implications of understanding
the common law as an iterative process, sensitively dependent upon
initial conditions subject to transformation by bifurcation.  This Arti-
open by asserting that strong legal rules are those that tend to reduce social costs or,
equivalently, to promote efficiency.  While this explanation rested on neoclassical eco-
nomic models that made narrow assumptions about human behavior, a parallel but
more capacious literature written by sociobiologists emerged.  It sought explanations
of common law evolution rooted in more descriptively accurate accounts of human
behavior.  In the past decade, vigorous devotion to these efforts by both legal econo-
mists and legal sociobiologists reemerged, with Oona Hathaway contributing impor-
tant insights from path dependence, which this Article deepens and extends. See
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001).
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cle shows, in Part III, that a result of this process is a dominant sys-
temic tendency in the common law towards stability in the population
of legal disputes attracted by the population of legal rules.  This Arti-
cle then shows, in Part IV, that this systemic tendency puts limits on
the systemic significance of judicial discretion.  The fabric of the com-
mon law absorbs social norms, more than any idiosyncratic prejudices
or tastes of particular judges.
The final Part draws the implications of the descriptive and nor-
mative points made in the first four Parts for studying law.  The impor-
tance of facts captured by the sensitive dependence on initial
conditions entails a substantial complexity in law that demands a close
and careful reading of individual cases to understand law.  Yet, the
resulting systemic stability and the influence of bifurcations reveal a
systemic simplicity in the common law process, entailing also a need
to study the rhythms of case law dispute resolution.  It is only from the
cases of the common law that its systemic complexity and simplicity
can be yoked, so selective examples will be the centerpiece of the ac-
count that follows.
I. INITIAL CONDITIONS
A conception of the common law as an iterative process can be
stated abstractly.  The primary basis of this conception is the idea of
sensitive dependence on initial conditions.  Initial conditions are the
facts and circumstances accompanying a given case and how a court
resolving the case articulates them (what Karl Llewellyn called situa-
tion sense).2  Sensitive dependence on initial conditions refers to how
later courts are constrained by what earlier courts said about those
conditions.
Available to any court when resolving a dispute is a population of
potentially applicable rules, one or more of which a judge applies
when resolving the dispute.  The rule so invoked may be called an
input rule.  By applying such an input rule to the situation, the case
yields a new result, which may be called an output rule.  The linkage
between the input rule and the output rule of cases over time defines
the characteristic essence of the common law as an iterative process.
While this abstract summary offers a useful introduction to con-
ceiving of the common law as an iterative process, a more animated
2 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960); see also Howard A. Levine, Lecture, Hugh R. Jones Lecture at Albany Law School,
67 ALB. L. REV. 1 (2003); Howard A. Levine, Deciding Cases in “The Common Law Tradi-
tion”: A Productive and Innovative Year for the Court of Appeals in Business and Commercial
Litigation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 355 (1998).
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account can be offered by providing doctrinal examples.  In what fol-
lows, the foregoing abstract points are animated using two venerable
doctrines that will be recognizable to any lawyer familiar with the com-
mon law: the contract law of third-party beneficiaries and the tort law
of privity.  These examples are furnished to animate the conception of
the common law as an iterative process, not to prove it; the analytical
appeal of this conception should exist apart from the illustrations.3
An important systemic reason why laws vary across jurisdictions
within a common law system is sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions.4  Each formulation of a legal rule depends on the facts of the
case germinating the rule, and each later formulation of a legal rule
depends on both the preceding formulations and on the facts of the
preceding cases where the rule was applied.
Take third-party beneficiary law. Lawrence v. Fox 5 involved facts
not directly covered by the existing population of legal rules.6  Law-
3 A complete catalogue of illustrations is functionally impossible to provide in a
single law review article.  While this preliminary inquiry uses a limited number of
illustrations, readers likely will recognize how other familiar doctrines exhibit the
characteristics it discusses and animates. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 1.  As an ab- R
breviated example, students of tort law may recognize the process discerned in the
elaborated illustrations in the series of New York tort cases concerning negligence
liability for breach of statutes, appearing in Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920)
(recognized); Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1927) (curtailed); Currie v. Interna-
tional Magazine Co., 175 N.E. 530 (N.Y. 1931) (instance of specific factual sensitivity);
Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939) (relation of statute to extant common law
rule).  For precise analysis of these New York tort cases plus secondary cases and lower
court cases situated in the social and legal environment of their period and other
cases spanning the twentieth century, see William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency:
The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117 (1999).
4 Sensitive dependence on initial conditions is not the only reason for doctrinal
variability across jurisdictions.  But it is a powerful systematic source of such variation.
5 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).  For a rich discussion of the factual background of Law-
rence v. Fox and analysis of the third-party beneficiary doctrine, see Anthony Jon Wa-
ters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1109 (1985).  For a study of Lawrence v. Fox attributing its status as a leading case
to its treatment by contracts casebook editors who were seeking to advance normative
agendas, see M.H. Hoeflich & E. Perelmuter, The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence
v. Fox in the Courts, the Casebooks, and the Commentaries, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 721
(1988).
6 There was little or no applicable New York law on third-party beneficiaries at
the time of Lawrence v. Fox.  The closest factual precedent was Farley v. Cleveland, 4
Cow. 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825), aff’d, 9 Cow. 639 (N.Y. 1827), but all three parties in
Farley had signed the contract.  Various other cases had dabbled in the rhetoric of
third-party beneficiaries, but it is difficult to discern in them a clear statement and
application of the principles. See infra note 11.  Nevertheless, a number of scholars R
have seized on such earlier statements to claim that Lawrence v. Fox did not break new
legal ground. E.g., 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 827, at 268–69
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rence loaned money to Holly, who in turn loaned the same amount to
Fox, with Fox promising Holly to repay that amount to Lawrence.7  In
Lawrence’s suit to enforce Holly’s contract with Fox, the court re-
jected Fox’s two arguments.8  It rejected as legally irrelevant his argu-
ment that Lawrence could not enforce the contract since the
consideration had flowed not from him but from Holly.9  More signifi-
cantly, it drew on the law of trusts to reject his argument that Law-
rence could not enforce the contract because he lacked privity with
Fox.10  The trust analogy recognized a constructive promise from Fox
(the promisee) to Lawrence (the beneficiary).11
The crucial fact in Lawrence v. Fox was that the promisee had been
indebted to the beneficiary and was seeking through the promisor’s
promise to have that debt discharged.  The court’s input rule was
from the law of trusts and produced an output rule of contract law
that permitted a stranger to a contract to enforce it.  The reformu-
lated rule from Lawrence v. Fox attracted an addition to the population
of legal disputes in Vrooman v. Turner,12 a foreclosure action by a mort-
gagee against a mortgagor and his grantees.13  The mortgagor had
given a mortgage on property to the mortgagee and later the mortga-
(1951); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1363
(1992); Peter Karsten, The “Discovery” of Law by English and American Jurists of the Seven-
teenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries: Third-Party Beneficiary Contracts as a Test Case,
9 LAW & HIST. REV. 327 (1991).
7 It seems Holly’s debt to Lawrence arose from illegal gambling so that Lawrence
could not have enforced his own contract with Holly. See Waters, supra note 5, at R
1123–27.
8 Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 273–75.
9 Id. at 274–75.
10 Id. at 273–74.
11 The doctrinal hurdles surmounted in Lawrence v. Fox are clear from the sepa-
rate dissenting and concurring opinions in the case.  A dissenting judge seemed to
accept the majority’s position on the consideration question but could not accept the
disposition or analysis of the privity claim. Id. at 275–81 (Comstock, J., dissenting).
The dissent observed that the majority was using trust concepts that were inapplicable
and that the majority could cite no authority for the conclusion it reached. Id. at 281.
The trust concepts had never before been used in the way the majority was using
them. Id.  Two concurring judges argued another route for enforcing the contract:
an agency theory, treating the promisee as the agent and the beneficiary as the princi-
pal. Id. at 275  (Johnson, C.J., and Denio, J., concurring) (concluding that “promise
was to be regarded as made to the [beneficiary] through the medium of his agent
[the promisee]”).  The conceptual problem of how the beneficiary could be the prin-
cipal if he had not made the promisee his agent was handled by deciding that the
promisee created the relationship by his actions and that the beneficiary ratified
them. Id.
12 69 N.Y. 280 (1877).
13 Id. at 280.
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gor sold the property to a nonassuming grantee.14  After a series of
further sales to nonassuming grantees a final conveyance was made to
an assuming grantee.15
The court took Lawrence v. Fox as its starting point, deciding that
the dispute was not within the scope of that case because the promisee
(the last grantor) was not obligated to the beneficiary.16  In Lawrence
v. Fox, there had been a creditor relationship and the purpose of the
promisor’s promise was to discharge the promisee’s debt.17  Not so in
Vrooman v. Turner, because the purported beneficiary (the mortgagee)
was not a creditor of the promise—the promisee (the last grantor)
had not assumed.
Emphasizing this essential factual difference between Lawrence v.
Fox and Vrooman v. Turner, the Vrooman court refused to permit the
contract stranger to enforce rights under the contract.18  Thus, the
result in Vrooman v. Turner is dependent on Lawrence v. Fox because it
furnished the basis to distinguish the facts of the cases.  At the same
time, Vrooman v. Turner created a new formulation of the legal rule:
the two cases together implied that a creditor relationship between
the promisee and the beneficiary was critical to permitting the benefi-
ciary to enforce the contract.19
The line between these cases was tested in Seaver v. Ransom,20
where the court forged a new category of third-party beneficiaries.  A
niece sued her uncle’s estate on a promise the uncle had made to the
aunt calling for him to leave the family home to the niece.21  He had
not done so, leaving the home to the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA).22  As in Lawrence v. Fox, the existing popu-
14 Id.
15 Id. at 280–81.
16 Id. at 284–85.
17 Id. at 285.
18 Id. at 286.
19 Other cases decided after Lawrence v. Fox but before Vrooman v. Turner that
contributed to this distinction are cited infra notes 67–68. R
20 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918).
21 Id. at 640.
22 On the aunt’s deathbed, the uncle proposed that she sign a will he had pre-
pared leaving him the family home for life, remainder to the SPCA. Id. at 639.  The
aunt objected to this, expressing her desire that the home pass to the niece following
the uncle’s death. Id.  The uncle then promised that if the aunt would sign the will
he had prepared, he would leave the niece the equivalent of the home in his will. Id.
at 639–40.  The aunt accepted this proposal and signed the will. Id.  By the time of
the uncle’s later death, however, he had not performed this promise, prompting the
niece’s lawsuit against the uncle’s estate to enforce his promise to the aunt. Id. at 640.
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lation of legal rules did not cover the dispute in Seaver v. Ransom.23
The New York Court of Appeals had limited third-party beneficiaries
to the pecuniary obligation class defined by Lawrence v. Fox and Vroo-
man v. Turner and a class of intimate beneficiaries composed of wives,
fiance´es, and children.24  Nevertheless, the court said the aunt-niece
relationship was close enough to the intimate categories to justify per-
mitting the niece to enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary—
the aunt-niece relationship created a sufficient moral duty in the aunt
to make the niece’s claim plausible.25
The court defended this expansion by a rhetorical characteriza-
tion of Lawrence v. Fox, agreeing with the lower court that the third-
party beneficiary doctrine is “progressive not retrograde.”26  The piv-
otal fact in Seaver v. Ransom was precisely the niece’s credibility, no
doubt bolstered in her contest with the SPCA by evidence that the
aunt was no pet lover.27  Using Lawrence v. Fox as the input rule, the
court created a new output rule: third-party “donee” beneficiaries
could also enforce contracts to which they were strangers.28
An astounding consequence of Lawrence v. Fox, Vrooman v. Turner,
and Seaver v. Ransom was the expanded scope of rights in third parties
accorded protection under government contracts.  Numerous cases in
the early twentieth century permitted third parties to recover under
government contracts, driven by evolving social norms which elevated
the importance of the role of the state in daily life.  In response to this
swing in the pendulum toward dispute-promoting rules, and the re-
sulting increase in the population of legal disputes, courts began to
reverse course and to prescribe new boundaries for recovery, creating
an expanding category of citizen beneficiaries not entitled to enforce
23 The lower court in Seaver v. Ransom imposed liability on a trust theory, con-
cluding that the uncle’s promise made him a constructive trustee of the home for the
niece.  Seaver v. Ransom, 168 N.Y.S. 454 (App. Div. 1917), aff’d on other grounds, 120
N.E. 639.  In a 4-3 affirmance on other grounds, the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected the trust theory because there was no trust res, the uncle having held the home
only as a life estate (an interest that died with him). Seaver, 120 N.E. at 640.
24 Seaver, 120 N.E. at 640.
25 Id. at 641.  The court also drew the analogy between a testamentary gift and
this oral contract for the niece’s benefit, id. at 642, although the former are of course
ordinarily required to be in writing under the law of wills and the aunt’s deathbed
“disposition” hardly satisfied the requisite formalities.
26 Id. at 641.
27 See Seaver, 168 N.Y.S. at 456.
28 Seaver, 120 N.E. at 642.
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contracts to which they are not parties.29  Third-party beneficiary law
has continued to vacillate since the middle of the twentieth century.30
Throughout, the legal rule formulated by each later case has de-
pended on the formulation of the legal rule, and particularly the fac-
tual context in which it germinated, in each of the prior cases.
Indeed, if a case having the facts of Seaver v. Ransom had preceded
one with the facts of Lawrence v. Fox, a sustained challenge to the priv-
ity and consideration constraints would have been hard to mount.  To
see this, consider the development of English law in these third-party
contests.  The 1677 decision of the King’s Bench in Dutton v. Poole 31
involved factual circumstances analytically identical to those of Seaver
v. Ransom.  In Dutton v. Poole, a father planned to sell wood to raise a
dowry for his daughter.32  The eldest son, seeking to inherit the wood,
interceded and promised the father that he would provide for the
daughter, if the father would not sell the wood.33  The father agreed.
After the son failed to pay, the daughter sued him.34  The court al-
lowed the lawsuit, rejecting the son’s arguments that the considera-
tion did not proceed from the daughter and that she was not in privity
with him.35
29 In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928), for example,
Cardozo denied that a warehouse owner was a third-party beneficiary of a water sup-
ply contract between a city and a public contractor.  Cardozo said the contractor
could not have consciously assumed the risk of a city burning to the ground in ex-
change for the trivial reward of payment for water supply. Id. at 898.  Following such
dispute-discouraging iterations of the rule, while creditors and donees could enforce
contracts to which they were not parties, a class of incidental beneficiaries could not.
Id. at 898–99.
30 In a series of formulations of dispute-promoting rules, mainly concerning
third-party rights to recover under government funded contracts creating broad pub-
lic benefits, courts transformed both the doctrinal shape of third-party beneficiary
law, as well as the broader fabric of public policy and social theory.  Third parties were
entitled to sue on a wide range of contracts involving such issues as affirmative action
in hiring handicapped employees, compliance with Medicare regulations, and admit-
ting minority children to desegregated public school systems.  This process led to a
dramatic expansion in third-party beneficiary claims, followed by a substantial reduc-
tion during the late 1960s and early 1970s and, more recently, another rebound. See,
e.g., Waters, supra note 5, at 1176–92 (discussing increases and decreases in the num- R
ber of claims based on third-party beneficiary theory from 1964–1985, a period dur-
ing which the Supreme Court created and later contracted certain private rights of
action under federal law).
31 (1677) 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (K.B).
32 Id. at 523.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.  Though Dutton v. Poole is the most famous of the English cases, it had in
fact been preceded by numerous other donee cases dating back to as early as 1597,
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While Dutton prevailed as the rule in a few subsequent English
cases,36 English courts later repudiated it.  In the 1861 case of Tweddle
v. Atkinson37 the court expressly denounced Dutton, declaring that it
was settled law in England that a party cannot enforce a contract un-
less the consideration in that contract “moves from the party to whom
it is made.”38  This remains the law in England, the House of Lords
having declared in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co.39 that it
is a fundamental principle of English law that “only a person who is
party to a contract can sue on it.”40  While the English Law Revision
Committee in 1937 sought to jettison this formulation and in effect
adopt the law of third-party beneficiaries as it had developed in New
York, that proposal died on the vine.41  Since then, moreover, English
courts have repeatedly refused to abdicate the positions announced in
Tweddle and Dunlop.42
A critical difference between the evolution of third-party benefici-
ary law in New York and England is, therefore, that in New York the
creditor relationship case came first and the donee relationship case
afterwards, whereas in England the fact patterns came in the opposite
order.  Once Lawrence v. Fox paved the way, the stretch to the donee
beneficiary rule in Seaver v. Ransom was a relatively short analogical
step.43  Without the springboard of a fact pattern like Lawrence v. Fox
from which to make such an incremental iteration, the English courts
and there had been one earlier creditor case, Bourne v. Mason, (1669) 86 Eng. Rep. 5
(K.B), that insisted on the presence of some special relationship between the prom-
isee and the beneficiary. Id. at 6.  It remains fair to say that the first case in England,
and indeed the first dozen or so cases, were donee cases.
36 E.g., Pigot v. Thompson, (1802) 3 Bos. & Pul. 147, 127 Eng. Rep. 80 (C.P.);
Martyn v. Hind, (1776) 98 Eng. Rep. 1174 (K.B).
37 (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.).
38 Id. at 764.
39 [1915] A.C. 847 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
40 Id. at 853.
41 See ENGLISH LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT (STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION), 1937, [Cmd.] 5449, at 25–30.
42 E.g., Beswick v. Beswick, [1966] Ch. 538, 552–55 (C.A.), aff’d, [1968] A.C. 58
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶¶ 18-019 to -020, at
1083–85 (H.G. Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004); see E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 10.2, at 744–45 (2d ed. 1990).  For further history of the doctrine in England, see
Comment, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in England, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 544 (1968).
43 Cf. Buchanan v. Tilden, 52 N.E. 724, 727 (N.Y. 1899) (“In a jurisdiction where
the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox is the settled law, there is no difficulty in sustaining
both in law and equity, the kindred principle anncounced in Dutton v. Poole.”).  Classi-
cal contract theory emphasized the element of bargain in an exchange by recognizing
the need for a promissory quid pro quo.  Gratuitous promises were unenforceable.
This stance makes Lawrence v. Fox an easier case than Seaver v. Ransom.
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would have needed to take broader leaps.  And while factual circum-
stances analogous to Lawrence v. Fox have been presented to English
courts, since the first major leap was taken in a fact setting more
nearly like Seaver v. Ransom and that leap was repudiated, the iterative
processes are moving along different courses.44
The important role of initial conditions also explains why the law
of third-party beneficiaries evolved differently in Massachusetts than
in New York.  As in England, the first third-party beneficiary fact pat-
tern in Massachusetts involved a donee beneficiary.45  While Massa-
chusetts courts upheld liability in that and a series of subsequent
donee cases,46 in later explaining those cases the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Mellen v. Whipple 47 characterized all of them
as constituting exceptions to the general rule against third-party en-
forcement rights.48  Rather than full repudiation against recognizing
third-party rights to enforce contracts as the English courts had done,
however, the Massachusetts court chose to limit the category to donee
cases as an “exception” to the ordinary rule.49  As in England, on the
other hand, and unlike in New York, the early broad doctrinal leaps
were narrowly circumscribed.  As in each jurisdiction, that classifica-
tion contributed an important element to the way Massachusetts third-
party beneficiary law has evolved.50
44 Cf. KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 229 (1990) (“It is perhaps regrettable that Tweddle v. Atkinson did not sim-
ply resolve the donee beneficiary’s rights . . . on the grounds that love and affection
was no longer sufficient consideration in [an] era different than Dutton v. Poole’s
and thereby preserve . . . the possibility that creditor beneficiaries could show
consideration . . . .”).
45 Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. (8 Tyng) 287 (1813) (permitting son to recover
on promise made to his father though father was not obligated to son).
46 Brewer v. Dyer, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 337 (1851); Carnegie v. Morrison, 43 Mass.
(2 Met.) 381 (1841); Felch v. Taylor, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 133 (1832); Cabot v. Haskins,
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 83 (1825); Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. (17 Tyng) 574 (1822); Arnold
v. Lyman, 17 Mass. (17 Tyng) 400 (1821); Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. (8 Tyng) 229
(1813).
47 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854).
48 Id. at 321.
49 Id. See generally Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991)
(examing the logical and practical significance of making exceptions to legal rules).
50 It is possible to identify other reasons for the very different evolution and state
of law concerning third-party rights in contracts in these jurisdictions.  Professor Ei-
senberg has argued, for example, that one can understand the earlier cases in En-
gland and Massachusetts permitting third-party donee claims to have been reversed in
tandem with the rise of the classical theory of contract.  Eisenberg, supra note 6, at R
1360–74.  Earlier judges acknowledged contract rights in third parties because they
were less troubled with the formal structure of contract promoted by the classical
school, which worshipped at the altars of privity and consideration. Id. at 1365.
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\81-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-JUN-06 14:02
2006] the  common  law  as  an  iterative  process 757
To deepen this animation of the common law’s iterative process
and related sensitive dependence on initial conditions, take another
example, that of privity in tort law.  The privity rule met its demise in
the evolution of the rule of inherently dangerous goods.51  The issue
addressed by this rule and its line of cases was under what circum-
stances a seller or owner should be liable for injuries sustained by one
other than the buyer or person dealing directly with the owner.  The
English courts’ first formulation of the inherently dangerous products
rule came in 1851 in Longmeid v. Holliday.52  The court refused to hold
Those constraints assumed axiomatic importance to judges during the classical period
who, in Professor Eisenberg’s view, retreated from the earlier formulations to deny
third-party contract rights.  As the hold of the classical school finally abated, contract
rights in third parties were once again recognized. Id.  It is the rise and fall of classi-
cal contract theory, according to Professor Eisenberg, that best explains the evolution
in the law of third-party beneficiaries in New York, England, and Massachusetts. Id. at
1366–69.  Professor Eisenberg’s explanation of the evolution of third-party benefici-
ary law in terms of the rise and fall of classical contract theory is certainly appealing.
Yet the description contains some chronological anomalies.  The Massachusetts and
English courts refused to uphold third-party contract rights as early as 1854 in Massa-
chusetts (Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317)) and 1861 in England (Tweddle
v. Atkinson, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.)).  This was many years before Langdell
and Williston emerged to propound the formalist thinking in contract law that is the
hallmark of the classical period.  And it was not until 1979 in Choate, Hall & Stewart v.
SCA Services, Inc., 392 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1979), that Massachusetts finally abandoned
its resistance to recognizing third-party rights generally as a matter of contract law,
long after the decline of classical contract theory, and, as noted, England has yet to do
so.  Nor does the rise and fall of classical contract theory account for why New York
escaped the clutches of classical contract theory’s formalism.  After all, New York
courts permitted recovery to third parties in 1859 (in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268
(1859)) and 1918 (in Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918)) and throughout the
intervening period of classical contract theory’s reign.  New York courts may have
been influenced by classical contract law, even after Lawrence v. Fox retreated from
potentially broader implications.  Despite this possibility, an alternative account of
these cases in terms of the iterative theory of the common law being discussed seems
equally plausible.
51 See William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
52 (1851) 6 Exch. 761, 155 Eng. Rep. 752.  The English courts had first grappled
with this kind of fact situation by invoking rules from the law of agency.  In Dixon v.
Bell, (1816) 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B), the court had permitted a third party to re-
cover for gunshot wounds inflicted by the owner’s servant because the owner had left
the gun “in a state capable of doing mischief.” Id. at 1024.  In a later fact pattern
where the gun had misfired in the child’s hands, the child was permitted to recover
from the seller on the formula that the seller knew the child would use the gun.
Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 2 M. & W. 519, 531–32, 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 868 (Exch. P.).
In doing so, the court in Langridge rejected the seller’s argument, which seemed to
draw on Dixon v. Bell, to distinguish between things “immediately dangerous or mis-
chievous by the act of the defendant” and “such as may become so by some further act
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the seller of a lamp liable to the wife of the buyer largely on the
grounds that the lamp, though containing naphtha that scorched the
woman, was not in its nature a thing of danger.53  The next year, the
New York court in Thomas v. Winchester 54 permitted recovery to a con-
sumer of poison erroneously bottled as a tonic against the manufac-
turer precisely on the grounds that the manufacturer’s negligence
had “put human life in imminent danger.”55
The defining initial conditions of the inherently dangerous prod-
ucts rule in England and New York, therefore, consisted of two ele-
ments.  The primary element—the factual context—differed in the
kind of good that had caused harm, a lamp in England and a bottle of
poison in New York.  The secondary element—the legal rule formu-
lated—was identical in each case, but in its application the courts clas-
sified the thing at issue on different sides of the rule.  In terms of
initial conditions, the lamp case of Longmeid v. Holliday is conceptually
equivalent to the donee beneficiary case that came first in England
(both denied recovery), and the poison case of Thomas v. Winchester is
conceptually equivalent to the creditor beneficiary case that came first
in New York (both permitted recovery).
These different initial conditions led courts in England and New
York faced with analytically identical fact situations to employ differ-
ent legal rules to resolve the disputes.  Both courts were asked to per-
mit a third party to recover against the constructor of defective
scaffolding.  The New York court in Devlin v. Smith56 held that scaf-
folding to be used in the painting of a courthouse was an inherently
dangerous article justifying liability to the third party.57  In England
the next year, the court in Heaven v. Pender 58 also permitted recovery
to a worker injured as the result of defective scaffolding used in the
painting of a ship but based its decision not on the inherently danger-
ous product rule but on the grounds that the dock owner had invited
to be done to it.” Id. at 867.  The court expressed concern about dabbling in any such
distinction, for doing so may invite lawsuits by “any person” who may come to possess
the gun and be injured by it. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).  In Winterbottom v. Wright,
(1842) 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. P.), the court distinguished these
cases to deny recovery to the operator of a defective coach on the grounds that the
nexus between the gun seller and the child/user had been tighter in those cases. Id.
at 404–05.
53 Longmeid, 155 Eng. Rep. at 755.
54 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
55 Id. at 409.
56 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
57 Id. at 478.
58 (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503.
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the worker onto the property.59  Similar to the evolution of third-party
beneficiary law—where the chronology of fact patterns created initial
conditions leading to the formulation of different legal theories with
which to enforce third-party contract claims—in these cases the na-
ture of the respective initial fact patterns led to the use of different
legal theories to enforce third-party tort claims.
There is a potentially troubling objection to the positive fact that
this constraint exists in the common law.  Professor Kress has noted
that the temporal ordering of common law dispute resolution, cou-
pled with the doctrine of precedent, implies that legal rights are de-
termined with an indifference to morality.60  Emphasizing the role of
initial conditions (or path dependence) in the evolution of the com-
mon law may be seen to make this concern more acute.
But the importance of initial conditions in the common law
should not be understood to mean that the different legal landscapes
that result from the iterative process always imply different results in
similar cases or that the doctrine of precedent disables judges from
reaching just results.  On the contrary, since the iterative process is
driven by facts and consists in reflecting and articulating social norms,
the judicial process in the common law enables sufficient doctrinal
malleability to suit the needs of justice in individual cases.61  For ex-
ample, courts circumvented the injustices that would sometimes result
from denying third-party rights by liberal use of trust and agency con-
cepts in England62 and by manipulating trust, property and tort con-
cepts in Massachusetts.63 While such approaches do pose adverse
consequences for doctrinal coherence, and therefore promote insta-
bility in the population of legal disputes, they do not rob the common
law of a moral dimension.
A second objection to this account of the common law can be
anticipated on grounds of parsimony.  Is not the evolution of third-
party beneficiary law and tort privity law equally and satisfactorily ex-
59 Id. at 514.
60 See Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights The-
sis, Retroactivity and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369, 371–72 (1984)
(“[T]he doctrine of precedent lead[s] to a morally troubling linear ordering prob-
lem: legal rights depend upon the temporal order in which cases are decided.”); see
also Hathaway, supra note 1, at 605 (describing as “unsettling” that “the order in R
which cases arrive in the courts can significantly affect the specific legal doctrine that
ultimately results”).
61 See Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1681 (1989).
62 E.g., Robertson v. Wait, (1853) 8 Exch. 299, 155 Eng. Rep. 1360 (trust theory).
63 E.g., Union Inst. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 81 N.E. 994 (Mass. 1907) (agency and
property theories); Hopkins v. Smith, 38 N.E. 1122 (Mass. 1894) (agency theory).
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plained in terms of path dependence alone?  This is the proposition
that the course of any process at a given time is constrained by the
prior course of that process.  The QWERTY keyboard is the common
example—originally designed to slow a typist down to accommodate
mechanical weaknesses of early typewriters, typing could be faster to-
day if the keys were reorganized.  While path dependence theories
offer various mechanisms for escaping initial conditions that put lim-
its on later evolution, they typically lack an adequate systemic account
of the process for overcoming the path dependence—e.g., how  ex-
isting systems might facilitate a switch from the QWERTY keyboard to
a superior one.64
Theories of common law precedent that contemplate defeating
undesirable lock-in effects of initial conditions must go outside path
dependence models for the solution to overcoming path depen-
dency.65  Viewing the common law as an iterative process does not
require such an excursion.  Rather, as the next Part will show, the
characteristic of sensitive dependence on initial conditions is coupled
with a systemic mechanism that facilitates overcoming the resulting
constraints while at the same time resisting sustained threats to insta-
bility, a mechanism I call bifurcation.66
II. BIFURCATION
The concept of bifurcation can be introduced abstractly.  The an-
nouncement of a surprising legal result in a case, such as in Lawrence
v. Fox, creates instability in the population of legal disputes cognizable
under that case.  The announcement cannot define with certainty or
even high probabilities what population of legal disputes it will sus-
tain.  The attracted population will eventually stabilize, however, as
the result in that case is repeatedly used as an input rule in later cases.
The later cases that use the first case and its result as an input rule
64 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641 (1996).
65 Clayton P. Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND
ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 245 (Steven J. Burton
ed., 2000); see also  Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV.
813 (1998).
66 In other words, a process that is path dependent may be characterized by sensi-
tive dependence on initial conditions, but it is also characterized by systemic con-
straints binding the process to the path and thwarting deviation.  A path dependence
account must go outside of the system it describes for such a mechanism.  The itera-
tive process of the common law is characterized by sensitive dependence on initial
conditions that set the course in motion but that process also contains within it a
mechanism for overcoming that constraint.
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yield an output rule that comes to resemble very closely the relation-
ship between the input rule and the output rule in prior iterations.
That close resemblance between such cases defines the property of
self-similarity.  While this abstract account offers a useful introduction
to this feature of the common law as an iterative process, it can be
animated by the two doctrinal examples so used in the preceding dis-
cussion of initial conditions.
Consider the third-party beneficiary cases following Lawrence v.
Fox.  The first cases involved uncertainty in the scope of the input rule.
But cases such as Vrooman v. Turner enhanced the stability of the pop-
ulation of legal disputes by delineating more clearly the population of
legal disputes the rule would sustain.  Though the facts of later cases
were of course different from those in Lawrence v. Fox, the differences
constituted variations on the theme.  The third party seeking to en-
force the contract was granted or refused that right according to
whether it was a creditor of the promisee.67  Applying the result of
Lawrence v. Fox in those cases was straightforward and involved no ma-
terial reformulation of that result.68  The input rule in each case
closely resembled the output rule in each case, and the relationship
between the input and the output rule in each case resembled that
relationship in other cases.  In short, the series of cases exhibited self-
similarity, which in turn meant that it offered greater stability in the
population of legal disputes the rule attracted.
Likewise, following the New York court’s announcement of the
“inherently dangerous” rule in Thomas v. Winchester, a period of self-
similarity of rule application ensued.  In a series of cases, the New
York Court of Appeals posed the issue as to whether a particular good
was or was not a thing inherently dangerous.  In Losee v. Clute,69 it put
a boiler that had exploded on the “not inherently dangerous” side
while, as noted, in Devlin v. Smith,70 it put scaffolding to be used in the
painting of a courthouse on the “inherently dangerous” side.  This
sorting out of liability based on the characteristics of the thing in-
67 E.g., Durnherr v. Rau, 32 N.E. 49 (N.Y. 1892) (finding that Lawrence v. Fox
requires relationship of debtor and creditor); Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N.Y. 233, 240
(1872) (denying recovery because party was not a creditor).
68 Indeed, courts often insisted explicitly on self-similarity. E.g., Lorillard v.
Clyde, 25 N.E. 917, 919 (N.Y. 1890) (noting that “courts have repeatedly said that the
principles of [Lawrence v. Fox] should be limited to the cases having the same essential
facts”); Wheat v. Rice, 97 N.Y. 296, 302 (1884) (“We prefer to restrict the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox within the precise limits of its original application.”).
69 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
70 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
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volved continued, exhibiting the property of self-similarity and sus-
taining a stable population of legal disputes.71
The emergence and articulation of new social norms and the dis-
carding of old ones constantly test the depth of self-similarity that
arises from repeated applications of a legal rule.  New dispute-promot-
ing rules increase the population of legal disputes attracted by the
population of legal rules, and that increase in turn creates instability
in the population of legal disputes.  For example, the category of inti-
mate relationships that came to be granted the right to enforce con-
tracts to which they were strangers pressed the limits of Lawrence v.
Fox.72  The population of legal disputes attracted by the emerging line
of cases began to threaten the stability in the population of legal dis-
putes that was otherwise being maintained by the self-similar line of
cases that did not depart materially from the Lawrence v. Fox para-
digm.73  So too with later applications of the inherently dangerous
products rule, in which the classes of goods considered to be inher-
ently dangerous began to expand.  In Torgesen v. Schultz,74 the court
characterized as inherently dangerous a bottle of aerated water and in
Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co.75 the court put a defective coffee urn in
the group.
As the attracted population of legal disputes expands in response
to new dispute-promoting rules, it also becomes unstable and puts
pressure on the input rule.  That pressure is released by an instance of
bifurcation—the application of that legal rule to a new dispute reveals
a marked departure from prior applications.  In a bifurcation, the in-
put rule remains intact but the output rule represents a distinct break
from it: the output rule is a new legal rule that will attract a different
population of legal disputes.  In particular, the input rule will con-
tinue to attract the stable portion of the population of legal disputes,
and the output rule will attract the unstable portion of that
population.
71 Self-similarity also characterized the English cases in this period. E.g., George
v. Skivington, (1869) 5 L.R. Exch. 1 (finding that consumer of hair wash purchased by
her husband could recover against the seller for injuries the hair wash caused on
grounds that the hair wash was inherently dangerous product).
72 E.g., Buchanan v. Tilden, 52 N.E. 724 (N.Y. 1899) (husband and wife); Todd v.
Weber, 95 N.Y. 181 (1884) (father and daughter).
73 Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 99 (1921)
(“We get a striking illustration of the force of logical consistency, then of its gradual
breaking down before the demands of practical convenience in isolated or excep-
tional instances, and finally of the generative force of the exceptions as a new stock, in
the cases that deal with the right of a beneficiary to recover on a contract.”).
74 84 N.E. 956 (N.Y. 1908).
75 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909).
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Seaver v. Ransom is an instance of bifurcation that may be seen as
intended to alleviate the instability in the population of legal disputes
threatened by the expanding classes of cases allowing third parties to
enforce contract rights.76  The Seaver v. Ransom court in effect had to
choose between two possible sources of sustaining stability in the pop-
ulation of legal disputes.  It could have refused to permit recovery to
the category of donee beneficiaries entirely.  That would have pro-
moted stability in the population of legal disputes by limiting the doc-
trine to the class of creditor beneficiary cases.  But it would also have
had the possible effect of promoting instability in other portions of
the population of legal disputes.
For example, the rules in Massachusetts and England denying
contract claims of third parties are dispute-discouraging rules with re-
spect to the population of legal disputes defined in terms of contract.
But those rules would risk increasing the population of legal disputes
attracted by other rules, such as the rules of trust law and agency law
that Massachusetts and English courts sometimes employed as the ba-
sis for third-party recoveries.77  Such a move in Seaver v. Ransom would,
therefore, have created as an output rule a new dispute-discouraging
rule but could have promoted instability in the population of legal
disputes attracted by previous output rules in trust law and agency law.
The other option available to the Seaver v. Ransom court, and the
one it chose, was to inject stability into the creditor class of cases by
segregating the stable portion of the population of legal disputes from
the unstable portion of the population of legal disputes.  By breaking
off the category of donee beneficiaries into a separate class, the court
would lend stability to the population of legal disputes attracted by the
old dispute-promoting rule governing creditor beneficiaries, and per-
mit the fluid working out of the contours of the new dispute-promot-
ing rule governing donee beneficiaries.
Bifurcations that create either dispute-promoting rules (as in
Seaver v. Ransom) or dispute-discouraging rules (the alternative not
taken in Seaver v. Ransom) seek to restore stability in the population of
legal disputes with respect to the input rule and tolerate instability in
the population of legal disputes attracted by the output rule or pre-
existing output rules.  Bifurcation always results in the evolution of the
rules upon separate courses.  The input rule tends to operate in a
region with enhanced stability in the population of legal disputes it
attracts and a return to an evolution characterized by self-similarity.
The output rule or the other pre-existing output rules tend to operate
76 See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text. R
77 See cases cited supra notes 62–63. R
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\81-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 18  1-JUN-06 14:02
764 notre dame law review [vol. 81:3
with respect to a population of legal disputes characterized by a tolera-
ble level of instability set on a course toward acquiring the characteris-
tic of self-similarity and eventual stability in that population.78
In a completely stabilizing bifurcation, stability in the population of
legal disputes attracted by the input rule immediately returns, and the
instability in the population of legal disputes attracted by the output
rule or the pre-existing output rules will be short-lived.  The immedi-
ate return of stability in the population of legal disputes attracted by
the input rule depends on whether applications of the input rule reac-
quire the characteristic of self-similarity.  If so, the population of legal
disputes it attracts will stabilize.  The instability in the population of
legal disputes attracted by the output rule or the pre-existing output
rules will be tolerable if the rule or rules eventually acquire the char-
acteristic of self-similarity in application.  If so, the population of legal
disputes that the rule or rules attract will stabilize and the tendency
toward stability would be reinforced by a later bifurcation that arrests
any tendency to stray from stability.
A partially stabilizing bifurcation can arise from one of three cir-
cumstances: the input rule not immediately reacquiring the character-
istic of self-similarity in its application, the output rule exhibiting no
tendency toward self-similarity in its application, or the pre-existing
output rules developing non-self-similar applications.  In any of these
circumstances, the affected rule instead evolves chaotically and the
pressure of intolerable instability in the population of legal disputes it
attracts is intense and immediate.  Rather than evolving toward an in-
stance of bifurcation, therefore, a partially stabilizing bifurcation leads
to eradicating the rule that attracts an unstable population of legal
disputes.79
A. A Partially Stabilizing Bifurcation
To determine whether Seaver v. Ransom turned into a completely
stabilizing or a partially stabilizing bifurcation, we must examine the
78 Each bifurcation therefore involves an implied judicial forecast about the
probability that the output rule (or pre-existing output rules) will eventually stabilize
and that the use of the output rule (or pre-existing output rules) distinct from the
input rule will restore stability to the population of legal disputes attracted by the
input rule.
79 A nonstabilizing bifurcation arises if both the input rule and the output rule
(or a pre-existing output rule) evolve without self-similarity.  The effects that apply
following a partially stabilizing bifurcation apply to both rules, or else the rules simply
meet obscurity (as by being ignored in later iterations). Cf. CARDOZO, supra note 73, R
at 22 (“Not all the progeny begotten of principles of a judgment survive . . . to
maturity.”).
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degree to which subsequent applications of the creditor beneficiary
rule germinated by Lawrence v. Fox reacquired the characteristic of
self-similarity and the degree to which later applications of the donee
beneficiary rule germinated in Seaver v. Ransom eventually acquired
that characteristic.  The creditor beneficiary rule following Seaver v.
Ransom did resume a stable course of development.  Numerous cases
were decided once again based on whether a creditor-debtor relation-
ship existed between the beneficiary and the promisee.80
The donee beneficiary rule following Seaver v. Ransom, in con-
trast, underwent a more chaotic evolution, vacillating between various
formulations of the rule and inhibiting stabilization in the population
of legal disputes being attracted.  On one hand, third parties were
permitted to enforce contracts though they were owed no duty by the
promisee.  For example, construction workers were permitted to en-
force contracts between their employer (a contractor) and the owner
for promises by their employer-contractor to comply with the law81 or
to pay workers specified wages.82  On the other hand, courts some-
times emphasized the absence of such a duty to refuse third-party en-
forcement of a contract that expressly identified the third party as a
donee beneficiary.83  As a result of these widely different formulations
and applications, the class of donee cases never achieved the kind of
self-similar quality that characterized the creditor beneficiary line of
cases that followed after Lawrence v. Fox and after Seaver v. Ransom.
The lack of self-similarity in the donee beneficiary category led
judges to shift the inquiry to focus on the intentions of the promisor
and the promisee rather than on the promisee’s relationship with the
beneficiary.84  The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
reflected this shift in their formulation of the rule by distinguishing
between intended and incidental beneficiaries.  They explained this
change as designed to avoid unnecessary confusion they believed had
followed from the creditor-donee distinction.85  Yet in that formula-
80 E.g., McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 195 N.E. 15, 18 (N.Y. 1935); George
W. Malthoy & Sons Co. v. Wade, 227 N.Y.S. 90 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 230 N.Y.S. 839 (App.
Div. 1928); Lewis v. Home Ins. Co., 181 N.Y.S. 839, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
81 Filardo v. Foley Bros., 78 N.E.2d 480, 481 (N.Y. 1948) (noting contractor prom-
ised the government to “obey all . . . applicable laws . . . of the United States”).
82 Fata v. S.A. Healy Co., 46 N.E.2d 339, 341–42 (N.Y. 1943) (holding workers
could recover where contractor promised the owner to pay workers some higher wage
than it had paid).
83 E.g., Dreyer v. Hyde, 167 N.E. 583, 585 (N.Y. 1929), criticized in 9 CORBIN, supra
note 4, § 827, at 273–75.
84 E.g., Cutler v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 361, 366–67 (N.Y. 1968); Sny-
der Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Purcell, 195 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (App. Div. 1960).
85 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 reporter’s note (1981).
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tion, strong strands of the creditor branch of the earlier rule remain,
whereas barely any strand of the donee branch of the earlier rule sur-
vived.  Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts expressly refers
to situations where the promisee was the beneficiary’s debtor,86 but it
is not explicit about the making of a gift to a beneficiary.
In short, the greater uncertainty in the third-party beneficiary
doctrine and the instability in the population of legal disputes being
attracted existed with respect to the parameters of the donee category
rather than the creditor category.  The donee category did not
achieve self-similarity, but the creditor category did.87 Seaver v. Ran-
som was, therefore, a partially stabilizing bifurcation because, while its
input rule reacquired the characteristic of self-similarity, its output
rule did not.  As a result, that output rule was eradicated, as the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts suggests.88
B. A Completely Stabilizing Bifurcation
Just as in the donee cases leading up to Seaver v. Ransom, the cate-
gory of inherently dangerous goods leading up to MacPherson v. Bu-
ick89 began to exhibit a sufficiently expansive character as to threaten
the stability of the population of legal disputes it would attract.90  Car-
dozo’s MacPherson opinion is a bifurcation that responds to evolving
social norms and recognizes this signal as a threat to destabilize the
population of legal disputes being attracted by this input rule.  Noting
recent cases extending the scope of the inherently dangerous prod-
ucts rule, Cardozo announced a commitment to the judicial trend to-
ward that extension.  Breaking from the input rule formulation,
86 Id. § 302(1)(a).
87 See 9 CORBIN, supra note 6, § 827, at 268–71. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at R
1373 (arguing Seaver v. Ransom’s “recognition of prior moral obligations as a basis for
enforcement was inherently much more expansive, less standardized, and more
openly dependent on social propositions than was the earlier restriction to pre-ex-
isting legal obligations”).
88 The decision of the Massachusetts court in 1979 to reject its approach to these
third-party disputes by manipulation of trust, property, and tort theories and instead
to adopt contract law rules, see Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 392 N.E.2d
1045 (Mass. 1979), may also be understood as a bifurcation.  The court sought to
jettison its input rules, which created instability in the population of legal disputes
being attracted because it necessarily altered the law of trusts, property, and tort from
which the manipulated rules were borrowed. See supra text accompanying notes
61–63. R
89 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. R
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Cardozo criticized the distinction between inherently dangerous and
potentially dangerous goods as involving “verbal niceties.”91
In refusing to be constrained by that formulation, Cardozo de-
fined a new, expanded legal rule: “If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger.”92  This bifurcation reflected the
insight that “[t]he principle that the danger must be imminent does
not change, but the things subject to the principle do change.”93  Be-
cause things included were expanding beyond what sense might say
were inherently dangerous, Cardozo needed a release against the
pressure of instability.
Cardozo clarified that those things in one category clearly created
a duty but those things in the other category still might create a duty,
though perhaps for different reasons.  In other words, this break is a
bifurcation precisely in the sense that, whereas it had become clear
that a special duty existed for the category of things inherently dan-
gerous, this did not mean there could not be a duty in the others.94
As a result, the bifurcation is intended to produce stability in the line
of cases involving products more easily characterized as inherently
dangerous, such as poison, and to tolerate some instability in the out-
put line governing more ambiguous product types.95
The bifurcation in MacPherson was a completely stabilizing one.
The input rule and the output rule each quickly came to be applied in
a manner characterized by the quality of self-similarity.  The input
rule line, governing inherently dangerous products, continued for
many years to be applied by New York courts.96  For goods that were
not in that category, liability could still be premised on a negligence
theory.97  In this line of cases, the central question concerned whether
the good was manufactured negligently, not whether the good was or
91 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055.
92 Id. at 1053.
93 Id.
94 Note the analogy to the bifurcation in Seaver v. Ransom—liability in creditor
cases was as clear as liability in inherently dangerous products cases.  What was un-
clear, and what the bifurcations sought to move toward, was liability in the donee
cases and in cases involving other product types negligently manufactured,
respectively.
95 The English courts delivered a bifurcation in their formulation of this rule in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
96 See Prosser, supra note 51, at 1102 nn.24 & 26 (citing cases). R
97 E.g., Hoenig v. Cent. Stamping Co., 6 N.E.2d 415, 415–16 (N.Y. 1936); Smith v.
Peerless Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1922); Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck
Corp., 268 N.Y.S. 545, 546 (App. Div. 1934).
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was not inherently dangerous.98  The output rule, therefore, emerged
as a general rule of negligence while the input rule continued to apply
to particularly dangerous goods without regard to the manner of man-
ufacture.99  In each case, applications of the rule were characterized
by self-similarity and therefore attracted a stable population of legal
disputes.100
98 See STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating
to Warranties of Fitness, in REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 409, 432–37 (1943).
99 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 395 cmt. b (1934); Lester W. Feezer, Manufac-
turer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REV.
1, 9–11 (1938); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products—The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 965–66 (1957).
100 Decades later, not surprisingly, iterative applications of the output rule led to
sufficient modifications of the negligence rule in this context that a new bifurcation
was necessary to release the consequent pressure of instability, a bifurcation first an-
nounced by Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1963). See Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717, 737–38
(1993).
You could also explain the tort-privity doctrine leading up to MacPherson in other
ways. The decline of the privity rule in tort—as well as the decline of privity as a
requirement in the third-party beneficiary context—can be seen as part of a broader
transformation of the common law.  A strong rule of privity came to be seen by many
as a primitive artifact of pre-industrial society.  The privity rule was substantially weak-
ened during the nineteenth century as competitive markets emerged and was ren-
dered anachronistic by the early twentieth century as the impersonality of those
markets became clear. See TEEVEN, supra note 44, at 231.  Professor Teeven points out R
that Seaver v. Ransom and MacPherson were decided at around the same time when
“[a]n equitable aversion to the shortcomings of privity was in the air in New York.”
Id.  Cardozo also made this link explicit in cases concerning tort liability for economic
loss to a third party resulting from the provision of false information pursuant to a
contract with another. E.g., Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444–48 (N.Y.
1931) (concluding that creditors and shareholders of a corporation could recover
from an independent auditing firm who certified to the corporation incorrect finan-
cial statements); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276–77 (N.Y. 1922) (saying that
“the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of prospective use” and holding that
the buyer was entitled to recover from public weigher who certified to the seller an
incorrect weight for goods).  But these forces are not entirely true.  The doctrine of
privity has been invoked by a large minority of states as a basis to refuse adopting
U.C.C. § 2-318(1)(a)’s extension of contract warranties to parties not in privity with
the seller of goods.  Even if true, moreover, those forces at most account for back-
ground conditions influencing social evolution, translated indirectly into the social
sub-system of the common law.  Understanding the common law as an iterative pro-
cess offers a more particularized account of how that translation happens and hence
of the mechanisms of common law evolution.
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III. STABILITY
The foregoing discussion used two doctrinal illustrations—from
third-party beneficiary law in contracts and privity law in torts—as
tools to animate this inquiry into the common law as an iterative pro-
cess with sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the possibility
of bifurcations.  These illustrations are intended to animate the
broader conceptual features of the common law being identified ab-
stractly (not to prove a story, for which a far larger “sample size” would
be necessary).  The common law as an iterative process so animated
bears normative implications, most generally concerning its systematic
stability.  Three generations of law students have been introduced to
legal reasoning through Edward Levi’s famous description of the com-
mon law process.101  Levi used the inherently dangerous products line
of cases to identify a spiraling motion in the evolution of legal rules in
the common law through three phases.102  Levi identified these three
phases as moving from the search for a statement of a legal rule, the
essential fixing of that formulation once sufficiently articulated and,
finally, the eventual breakdown of the formulation.103  In Levi’s story
of the inherently dangerous products line of cases in New York, the
search began with Thomas v. Winchester and underwent a period of
fixing leading up to MacPherson v. Buick, which in turn marked the
breakdown of the older formulation.104  For Levi, the breakdown gen-
erates the need for a new search, restarting the process and carrying it
forward in an endless spiraling process.105
Levi’s story is certainly appealing, especially as an introduction to
legal reasoning.  As an account of the process of the common law,
however, it fails to capture the systemic tendency toward stability.
Levi’s phase of fixing corresponds to the period when a rule is charac-
terized by self-similarity—much of the period between Thomas v.
Winchester and MacPherson, for example.  The moment in the iterative
understanding equivalent to Levi’s breakdown phase is the instance of
bifurcation—the MacPherson example in both cases.  But Levi’s break-
down would follow from an implosion of the rule under the stress of
the category and lead to a completely new formulation.  In contrast to
each of these points, a bifurcation occurs when the stability of the
101 See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 36
(2nd ed. 1995); EDWARD H. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); see also
Hathaway, supra note 1. R
102 LEVI, supra note 101, at 8–27. R
103 See id.
104 See id. at 14–20.
105 See id. at 27.
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population of legal disputes being sustained under the input rule is
threatened and represents the formulation of a new and separate rule
that coexists along with the old and prior rule.
Self-similar applications need not be jettisoned and substituted
with a new formulation, but rather the old and the new endure side-
by-side.  Thus, MacPherson did not discard the inherently dangerous
products rule but instead split from it in creating a new output rule of
negligence.  Similarly, Seaver v. Ransom did not discard the creditor
beneficiary rule but instead split from it in creating a new output rule
of donee beneficiaries.  It was only the lack of self-similarity in the
donee beneficiary cases that ultimately led to the discard and eradica-
tion of that rule and that consequence of a partially stabilizing bifurca-
tion does represent an instance of Levi’s breakdown phase.  The
common law process does not entail so much a perpetual spiraling
motion but rather is iterative and better captured imagistically by a
continuously bifurcating series of lines through time.
As for Levi’s initial search phase, instances of bifurcation may be
seen to represent starting nodes of such a phase.  And, as with each
judicial application of a legal rule, a bifurcation is driven by the initial
conditions in which it is applied.  Instances of bifurcation, as well as
other applications of legal rules, therefore recall Karl Llewellyn’s dis-
tinction between how a judge announcing a legal rule understands
that rule and how later judges interpret that understanding.106  For
Llewellyn, the distinction meant that the announcement of a novel
legal result cannot itself constitute a legal rule.107  Rather, its rule
characteristic would not arise until later courts applied the earlier
court’s result.108  Later courts could therefore conclude that the result
in the earlier decision was narrower or broader than the earlier court
thought it was.109  This distinction implies that through narrowing or
broadening the results of earlier decisions, later courts could substan-
tially break any link between successive cases over time.  But sensitive
dependence on initial conditions implies a closer link between these
events than Llewellyn explicitly recognized.
106 K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 52 (1960)
(explaining “distinction between the ratio decidendi, the court’s own version of the




109 Id.  Llewellyn was clear in his belief that later courts could narrow the earlier
court’s rule but less clear that later courts could broaden it, see Joel Levin, The Concept
of the Judicial Decision, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 208, 217 n.28 (1983), though this latter
point also seems implicit in his discussion.
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The first judge and each later judge are all constrained to operate
within the facts set forth in the first case.  Those facts, the initial condi-
tions, link the judges irrevocably.  Maybe the distinction between what
the first court says as law or rule and what later courts understand it to
mean is potentially significant, as Llewellyn contended.  Yet each is
constrained by what the first court says as fact—by the initial condi-
tions as the first court stated them.  That later courts attributed to
Lawrence v. Fox a significance the judges in that case may not have
contemplated supports Llewellyn’s thesis,110 but the key facts of that
case controlled what could be said about it.111  And it was precisely the
creditor facts of Lawrence v. Fox that supported the maintenance and
broadening of third-party beneficiary law in New York, whereas the
donee facts of the early English and Massachusetts cases strongly in-
hibited the extension of that doctrine in those jurisdictions.112
Consider too the initial facts of the English and New York cases
that started the inherently dangerous products line of cases—
Longmeid v. Holliday and Thomas v. Winchester, respectively.  Whatever
later courts may have been able to say about the legal rules stated in
those cases, the facts of those cases substantially controlled how later
cases would be decided.113  More than how later courts choose to treat
the earlier result, therefore, what is important is how the first court
stated the facts.  The initial conditions constrain later judges in their
understanding of what the first court said or did.  To that extent, the
result in the earlier case constitutes at least the germination of a legal
rule and binds later courts as a matter of law.
More than Llewellyn, Cardozo noticed the strong link between
cases over time.  He observed that there is a tendency in law “toward
the reproduction of kind,” that every legal judgment “has a generative
power,” and that each judgment “begets in its own image.”114  The
source of these tendencies is the rule of sensitive dependence on ini-
tial conditions, and the tendencies can be redescribed as manifesta-
tions of the quality of self-similarity.  But there the resemblance of the
theory of the common law as an iterative process to Cardozo’s concep-
tion ends, for Cardozo went on to say that the common law involves a
constant dynamic element in which nothing is stable,115 though there
is a “constant striving of the mind for a larger and more inclusive
110 See Hoeflich & Perelumter, supra note 5, at 735–37. R
111 See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. R
112 See supra text accompanying note 31. R
113 See supra text accompanying notes 52–59. R
114 CARDOZO, supra note 73, at 21. R
115 Id. at 28.
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unity, in which differences will be reconciled, and abnormalities will
vanish.”116
Cardozo thus implies an endless searching, much as Levi envi-
sioned an endless spiraling motion.  But bifurcations imply that cer-
tain searches end in realizing stability—a completely stabilizing
bifurcation produces stability in the population of legal disputes at-
tracted by both the input rule and the output rule (or pre-existing
output rules), and even a partially stabilizing bifurcation produces sta-
bility in the population of legal disputes with respect to one of the
rules.  While it is true that the stability promoted by a bifurcation is
rarely permanent,117 the key point is that stability prevails for signifi-
cant periods of time.  Understanding the common law as an iterative
process therefore suggests that the goal of stability is realized more
often than either Cardozo or Levi thought.
The systemic tendency toward stability dominates other discrete
objectives that have been seen to drive the common law process.  Con-
sider efficiency.  George Priest and others have shown that the com-
mon law tends to produce efficient rules and to replace inefficient
rules with efficient ones.118  Yet more than one efficient rule could be
formulated to address a particular issue and some inefficient rules
persist.119  Rules that survive, whether they are efficient or inefficient,
do so because they tend to promote stability in the population of legal
disputes being attracted by the population of legal rules.  The mecha-
nisms that assure their survival and promote that stability are sensitive
dependence on initial conditions and self-similarity.
In some instances, rules formulated to promote stability may also
happen to promote some form of efficiency.  Thus one could ac-
knowledge that the privity rule, in both tort and contract, had become
inefficient in the maturing markets at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury.120  That acknowledgement could then be used to explain the liti-
gation that led to Seaver v. Ransom’s formulation of the donee
category of third-party contract beneficiaries and of the litigation that
116 Id. at 50.
117 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. R
118 E.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65–66 (1977); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common
Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005); Paul
H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (1977); Todd Eric
Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999); J. Zywicki, The
Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1551 (2003).
119 See Roe, supra note 64, at 642, 653–62. R
120 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 284–86 (1987).
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led to MacPherson’s formulation of the negligence rule in third-party
tort claims.  It remains true, however, that scores of creditor benefici-
ary cases were brought during the period leading up to Seaver v. Ran-
som and scores of negligence cases were brought in the period after
MacPherson.  It therefore seems more likely that litigants prosecute ac-
tions based on whether their claims are cognizable under the prevail-
ing population of legal rules and that the population of legal disputes
is not driven principally by whether the existing population of legal
rules is comprised of greater or fewer efficient or inefficient rules.
The subordination of efficiency to stability is not solely a function
of the systemic tendencies of the common law’s iterative process oper-
ating at the level of doctrine.  It is also reinforced by the distinctive
characteristics of legal culture.  Robert Clark has shown that the com-
plex web of rules that now comprises the corporate income tax is a
function of a few initial decisions made at the time the corporate in-
come tax was enacted.121  In the terminology of this Article, the evolu-
tion of that body of law has exhibited sensitive dependence on initial
conditions—the factual context in which that body of law germinated
was an initial condition upon which that evolution has sensitively de-
pended.122  But Dean Clark’s point is broader, for it also defines as
subject to the rule of sensitive dependence on initial conditions the
character of the legal culture in which legal rules operate, including
the cultural condition of a thirst for stability.123
The salience of the cultural desire for stability and the common
law’s systemic tendency towards stability in the population of legal dis-
putes raise the question of the relationship between the value of stabil-
ity and the role of social norms.  Melvin Eisenberg has identified as
objectives of the common law both doctrinal stability on the one hand
and the harmonization of legal rules with social norms (called social
congruence) on the other.124  Professor Eisenberg’s account of the
nature of the common law treats these objectives as trade-offs.125
121 Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 92–93 (1977).
122 See id. at 93.
123 Dean Clark’s account also shows that the complexity of a body of doctrine can
be understood not only to evolve according to a simple rule of self-similarity, but also
that the very process itself is a simple function of the legal culture defined by the few
early decisions.
124 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 44–47 (1988).
Professor Eisenberg also identifies as an objective of the common law the harmoniza-
tion of legal rules with one another (called systemic consistency). Id. at 44.
125 For purposes of this discussion, doctrinal stability is the functional equivalent
of stability in the population of legal disputes attracted by the population of legal
rules.
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The tension Professor Eisenberg identifies between doctrinal sta-
bility and social congruence is at once a product of the common law’s
iterative process and also a source of the tension’s own attenuation
and potential dissolution.  Doctrinal stability is promoted by the rule
of sensitive dependence on initial conditions—the link between cases
over time—and is evidenced by self-similarity—the manifestation of
repeated applications of a legal rule.126  The tension is a product of
the iterative process in that non-self-similarity is evidence that the
value of social congruence is being elevated above the value of doctri-
nal stability.  Once there is substantial pressure on an input rule—
substantial evidence of a decline in self-similarity—a bifurcation is
justified.
At that moment, the tension between doctrinal stability and social
congruence attenuates, and sometimes dissolves, because a bifurca-
tion promotes stability in the population of legal disputes attracted by
the input rule while advancing the value of social congruence by toler-
ating a level of instability in the population of legal disputes attracted
by the output rule (or pre-existing output rules).  Consider tort-privity
law.  Doctrinal stability in that body of law—and therefore stability in
the population of legal disputes—reigned during the period of self-
similarity in tort-privity law before MacPherson.  Prevailing social norms
had entailed a structural tension between the individual and the envi-
ronment.127  During the period of declining self-similarity, social
norms moved towards a different structural tension, that between the
individual and others.128  The judicial response to that shift
threatened to destabilize the doctrine and consequently the popula-
tion of legal disputes that the rules attracted.  It was in response to
that threat to stability that Cardozo delivered the bifurcation in Mac-
Pherson when he articulated the negligence rule.  In doing so, doctri-
nal stability and social congruence were both advanced; doctrinal
stability by restoring self-similarity to the input rule, and social congru-
ence by germinating a rule that would respond to the emerging struc-
tural tension between the individual and others.
IV. DISCRETION
The mutually reinforcing relationship between stability and social
congruence dilutes the systemic significance of judicial discretion in
126 See supra text accompanying notes 102–09.
127 See Donald H.J. Herman, Phenomonology, Structuralism, Hermeneutics and Legal
Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 379, 398 (1982).
128 Id.
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the common law process.  It is true that much about the common law
and about individual cases can be learned from studying judicial tem-
peraments, attitudes and philosophies.  It is also sensible to take such
judicial characteristics into account when elected officials make judi-
cial appointments or when the citizenry elect judges.  But while those
characteristics undoubtedly play a part in the fabric of the law over
time and in the outcomes of individual cases, the systemic tendencies
of the common law’s iterative process impose constraints on the sys-
temic significance of judicial discretion.129
Take Cardozo and Posner, two of the twentieth century’s most
luminous, and normatively antipodal, judges.130  Cardozo is well
known for having produced important tort opinions that tended to
open the door to increased liability131 and important contracts opin-
ions that tended to expand the ambit of binding contractual relation-
ships on the basis of doctrines like the implied obligation of good
faith.132  Posner is well known for doing precisely the opposite—clos-
ing the door to liability in important tort opinions133 and restricting
the ambit of contractual liability by truncating the obligation of good
faith in important contracts opinions.134  A normative predisposition
to these stances may be enough to explain the results those and other
judges reach in individual cases, but it does not explain why certain
judges and the opinions they write contribute significantly to the re-
sulting doctrinal fabric of the common law.
A more complete explanation is that judicial positions that be-
come part of the fabric of the common law are those that are congru-
ent with the common law’s systemic tendencies operating when the
occasion for those positions arose.  Even as skilled a judge as Cardozo
could not have achieved the masterstroke of MacPherson without the
129 Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L. J. 583, 616
(1992) (modeling a critique of common law efficiency to suggest that a claim of con-
gruence between case outcomes and dominant judicial ideologies is weak at best).
130 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1379, 1423 (1995).
131 See, e.g., supra note 100 (noting expansion of tort liability in Cardozo’s opin- R
ions in Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), and Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931)).
132 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (find-
ing that an agent’s implied promise to use reasonable efforts in marketing a princi-
pal’s designs furnished consideration for a binding contract).
133 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299–300 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (suggesting that the act of class certification may
constitute a denial of due process to defendants in class actions).
134 See, e.g., Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir.
1986); see also Cunningham, supra note 130. R
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operational forces of the common law’s iterative process.  The decline
of self-similarity in tort-privity law leading up to that dispute and the
social norms the decline reflected were necessary conditions to justify
and to sustain the bifurcation in that case.
Similarly, Posner announced in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.135
that class certification in tort actions may constitute a denial of due
process to defendants.136  Substantial pressure had been mounting to
develop mechanisms to limit dispute-promoting rules in mass tort ac-
tions.137  Posner’s move in Rhone-Poulenc may be seen as a bifurcation
that responds to that pressure.  It may be quite a clever or even bril-
liant one, but it is sustainable only so long as the doctrinal pressures
and social conditions that justify it are sustained as well and not re-
leased by other means.
The same holds true for Cardozo’s other momentous opinions
that broke new legal ground, including Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon.138 Wood was a bifurcation that arose in a period marking the
transition from simple markets characterized by face-to-face dealings
and relative stability to complex commercial society, impersonal eco-
nomic exchange and greater uncertainty and market volatility.139
These changing circumstances both justified and sustained Cardozo’s
innovation in Wood declaring that an implied obligation to use reason-
able efforts could furnish consideration for a promise.140  In contrast,
Posner’s truncating of the good faith obligation in the performance of
contracts141 came at a time when various other law reform proposals
were heading in the same direction.  For example, then pending pro-
posals to revise Article 8 of the U.C.C. would reverse rules that require
performance in good faith in favor of rules that merely discourage
bad faith.142
135 51 F.3d 1293.
136 Id. at 1299–300. But see id. at 1304–08 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (implying that
class certification would not violate due process).
137 E.g., B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Cougars and Lawyers Win in California Ballot Mea-
sures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at B12 (discussing close vote on ballot propositions in
the forefront of national movement to reduce tort litigation); Max Boot, Op-Ed.,
Judges Rebel Against Mass Tort Excesses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1996, at A15.
138 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
139 Cunningham, supra note 130, at 1397. R
140 See id. (citing Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century,
39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 419 (1988)).
141 See, e.g., Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
142 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform
of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 298 (observing that
personal property conveyancing law usually provides that first-in-time claimant
prevails unless second-in-time claimant can establish elements giving her a preferred
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If written today, Cardozo’s opinions in MacPherson and Wood
might go unremarked and unabsorbed.  But they were momentous
when written because they represented the crest of a wave of social,
economic, and doctrinal forces building toward the bifurcations he
delivered in those cases.  Posner’s opinions, if written in the 1920s,
may well have been flops, because the waves were cascading the other
way.143  They are important and successful now because they build on
and follow from emerging sentiments about social and economic con-
ditions.144  Indeed, the reason that most judicial opinions are ho-hum
is that those forces rarely combine with sufficient pressure to call for
or to justify a masterstroke.  Cardozo—and increasingly Posner—had
the good fortune to face and to respond to such pressures.145
The requirement of pressure necessary to justify a bifurcation
thus limits the scope of judicial discretion.  It constrains judges from
injecting their own private prejudices into the iterative process of the
common law and instead facilitates a process by which emerging social
norms are absorbed.146  Cardozo’s positions on tort and contract and
Posner’s opposite positions on tort and contract move into or out of
the common law as a reflection not so much of their own private be-
liefs but of the phase in the common law’s iterative process in which
each judge works.
status, usually including purchase for value and some element of good faith, whereas
revised U.C.C. Article 8 provides that second-in-time claimant prevails unless first-in-
time claimant can establish elements giving her a preferred status, including that the
second-in-time claimant acted in bad faith); see also Cunningham, supra note 130, at R
1424 n.237.
143 See Cunningham, supra note 130, at 1423–24. R
144 E.g., Paul M. Barrett, Bench Pressure: Federal Appeals Judge Embraces Liberalism in
Conservative Times, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1996, at A1 (describing how one judge’s opin-
ions, which were once accepted as mainstream views, are increasingly out of step with
the social ideology of the time).
145 This is not to deny that personal and intellectual qualities play a significant
role in the development of judicial reputation.  Cardozo, Posner, and other great
judges tend to stand as emblems of particular schools of thought, judicial philoso-
phies, and political sensibilities.  They stand out that way, not by the raw force of their
own beliefs but by the degree to which those beliefs are congruent with emerging
social norms and economic conditions.  Ideology alone is not what matters, but how
that ideology can be, or made to seem, congruent with the systemic tendencies at
work.  Thus, while personal and intellectual qualities are necessary to enable a judge
to see and to convince others about the link between their views and social norms and
economic conditions, they are not a sufficient condition, for the fortuities of time and
politics play a substantial role in judicial reputation. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CAR-
DOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 65, 68 (1990).
146 Of course, private judicial prejudices that accord with emerging social norms
will be absorbed into the doctrinal fabric of the common law.
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V. STUDYING LAW
Initial conditions contribute to stability as bifurcations both re-
lease threats to instability and enable dynamic evolution of the com-
mon law in ways that constrain judicial discretion.  The blending of
seemingly opposed characteristics of stability with dynamism and self-
similarity with iteration encases the blending of a more general pair of
opposites, complexity and simplicity, each of which also characterizes
the common law and must inform us of how law ought to be taught
and studied.
The traditional method by which the complexity of vast bodies of
case law is made manageable is through a process of case matching
and synthesis.  The method seeks to promulgate integrated restate-
ments of law in the form of black letter rules.  By this method simplic-
ity is wrested from complexity.  Complexity inheres in bodies of case
law both because each case is an instance of innovation and because a
body of law seems to become more complex as one adds more cases
over time.  The discrete facts of each legal dispute, including as shown
in Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v. Ransom, drive both the input rule em-
ployed to resolve the dispute and the output rule that results from
that resolution.  And the body of law seems to become more complex
as more cases are added, as the law of third-party beneficiaries seemed
to become more complex as it evolved from Lawrence v. Fox to Vroo-
man v. Turner to Seaver v. Ransom and beyond.
Restatement formulations attempt to give smoothness of form to
the cases, both alone and as a body.  Consider the formulations of
third-party beneficiary law set forth in the Restatement (First) and Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts.  The Restatement (First) delineated
two categories of strangers to a contract who could enforce it, creditor
and donee beneficiaries.147  This formulation simplified, reasonably
accurately, the rules that emerged from Lawrence v. Fox and Vrooman
v. Turner (the creditor beneficiary rule) on the one hand and Seaver v.
Ransom (the donee beneficiary rule) on the other.
As the iterative process of the common law continued, however,
through the fluctuation in the population of legal rules between dis-
pute-promoting rules and dispute-discouraging rules, a new category
seemed to emerge.  This category was seen to focus less on the kind of
relationship that existed between the promisee and the beneficiary
and more on the intentions of one or both parties to the contract, the
promisee and the promisor.  The Restatement (Second) attempted to
reflect this evolution by jettisoning the distinction between creditor
147 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
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and donee beneficiaries in favor of a category of intended benefi-
ciaries.148  This group could enforce rights in contracts to which they
were strangers.  A separate category of incidental beneficiaries could
not.149
While each of these Restatements of the doctrine was plausible
given the vast body of case law being described, the method of pro-
mulgation necessarily involved a distillation of the complexity of the
case law into a simple statement of what were seen as its core princi-
ples.  Understanding common law as an iterative process implies a
more natural and organic relationship between simplicity and com-
plexity.  In particular, the apparent complexity of an iterative process
is driven by a simple rule; and, a simple depiction of the process at a
single moment in time will fail to capture the complexity of the pro-
cess as a whole.150
In the common law, the apparent complexity of a body of cases is
at bottom the function of a very simple algorithm dictated by the prin-
ciple of stare decisis: legal rules operate as inputs and become refor-
mulated as outputs comprising the population of legal rules.151  These
in turn become inputs, in a process of potentially infinite duration.
So what appears to be complex is a function of a very simple idea.
Conversely, a statement about the doctrine at a point in time gives a
simple appearance to a doctrine that is in fact highly complex.152  In
short, assimilation of cases into black letter rules at once artificially
simplifies the complexity and also conceals the simplicity underlying
that complexity.
Restatement formulations of law are like a generalized Euclidean
triangle depicting a tree—it gives you the idea but not the full texture.
For example, Vrooman v. Turner evades neat characterization under
either Restatement formulation of the third-party beneficiary rule.
Close study of that case shows great complexity, and the third party
(the mortgagee) can be seen as the kind of beneficiary defined in
each Restatement formulation as entitled to enforce the contract—a
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979).
149 Id.  On the substantial role Professor Corbin played in bringing about this
change, see generally Waters, supra note 5.  For a dissent from Professor Waters’s R
view, see Hoeflich & Perelmuter, supra note 5, at 728. R
150 This feature also characterizes Hegelian jurisprudence. E.g., ALAN BRUDNER,
THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
151 Compare Hathaway, supra note 1, at 650–63 (drawing normative implications R
for stare decisis from analysis of path dependency in the common law).
152 Anthony D’Amato’s work contains within it a similar implication—that the law
is becoming ever more complex.  Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV.
1 (1983).
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donee, creditor, or intended beneficiary.153  Yet the mortgagee’s
claim was denied.  More generally, the Restatement (Second)’s de-
lineation between intended and incidental beneficiaries is more capa-
cious than the leading cases would seem to warrant.  And of course
neither Restatement captured the state of Massachusetts law.154  Any
Restatement formulation of black letter rules thus necessarily simpli-
fies the vast complexity of the doctrine being described similar to the
way generalized Euclidean shapes only describe complex natural
forms as simplifications.155
Restatement formulations also obscure the simplicity of the itera-
tive process by purporting to depict the doctrinal shape of the law at a
fixed point in time.  But the complexity is in reality a function of a
simple iterative process.  The iterative process by which legal rules op-
erate as inputs and become outputs through successive operations of
dispute resolution is, as a system, quite simple.  But you won’t get that
from reading Restatements.
Restatement formulations of legal rules therefore oversimplify
the complexity of legal doctrine but also obscure the simplicity under-
lying that complexity.  Simplifying complex doctrine by Restatement
formulations is valuable for numerous purposes.  A principal purpose
of Restatements, as well as of case matching and synthesis generally, is
to improve accuracy in forecasting the outcome of future legal dis-
putes.156  To the same end, however, a more critical approach would
examine the ultimate simplicity of the iterative process by which the
common law evolves.157
Widely-held intuitions about the common law embrace this per-
spective on process.  Consider the dominant method of law teaching
in the United States, especially in first-year courses.  Socratic case
method instruction attends to the historical evolution of the common
law.  It looks to synthetic statements of the law, such as in Restate-
153 CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 17.6, at 675–76 (5th ed. 2003).
154 Massachusetts did not adopt the third-party beneficiary doctrine as a matter of
contract law until 1979 and did so citing preliminary drafts of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts.  Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 392 N.E.2d 1045,
1049–53 (Mass. 1979).
155 Put in more traditional terms, the issue is at what level of generality the state-
ment of a legal rule is meaningful.
156 In the second series of all Restatements, there is also a strong prescriptive
strand. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 1.8, at 26 (“To some extent the expanded R
role of comments, to permit criticism as well as explanation, has helped to provide a
vehicle for the expression of idealism.”).
157 Cf. LLEWELLYN, supra note 106, at 48 (case matching as predictive tool offers R
scientific approach without scientific results).
\\server05\productn\N\NDL\81-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 35  1-JUN-06 14:02
2006] the  common  law  as  an  iterative  process 781
ments, only as a supplement to the pedagogical enterprise.158  And
this way of learning law is by no means limited to formal legal educa-
tion but rather pervades the practice of common law.  For it is only
through a study of prior applications of legal rules that one can know
law.159  Understanding the common law as an iterative process charac-
terized by sensitive dependence on initial conditions and a systemic
tendency towards stability is a way to formalize the intuition behind
this way of studying and investigating law.160  It makes sense of the
common law’s evolutionary process.161
CONCLUSION
This preliminary inquiry into the common law as an iterative pro-
cess represents a modest but novel contribution to a vast and hoary
discourse.  In summary, the inquiry shows the common law to be a
remarkably stable system that constrains the systemic significance of
judicial discretion.  The common law does this through a complement
of initial conditions linking cases over time with the possibility of bi-
furcations that enable charting significant course changes.  It is an it-
erative process of endless repetition that is simultaneously stable and
dynamic, self-similar but evolving, complex but simple.
The inquiry’s contribution builds upon but recasts longstanding
accounts of the common law’s evolutionary characteristics.162  Since
these varied accounts date back centuries and continue to captivate
students of the common law, the iterative conception cannot end the
study.  But it might provide a relevant and resonant method of ap-
proach.  If so, students of the common law likely will bring to their
reading examples familiar to them that likewise reflect the rhythms
outlined.
158 The authors of the Restatement (First) planned to keep it updated by supple-
mentary treatises to be prepared from time to time, FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 1.8, R
at 25, but lack of agreement among the proposed authors of those treatises prevented
that ambition from being fulfilled.  The Restatement (Second) nods in that direction
by “its fuller elaboration in text and comment[s],” id. § 1.8, at 30, and this approach
reflects, but does not fully implement, the thesis being advanced here.
159 See Jacobson, supra note 61, at 1681–82. R
160 Compare Paul D. Carrington, Book Review, 72 CAL. L. REv. 477, 490–91 (1984)
(reviewing ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S (1983)) (arguing that the practical benefits of the case method
explain its persistence), with Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal
Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2–10 (1951) (analyzing the
scientific, pedagogical, pragmatic, and historical presuppositions of the case method).
161 See supra note 1. R
162 See supra note 1.
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